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In the Supre1ne Court
of the State of Utah
VIRGIL REDMOND,
Appellant and Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 7562

PETTY MOTOR COMPANY,
a corporation,
Respondent and Defendant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent is not satisfied with the statement
of facts contained in the appellant's brief and desires
to set out herein a statement of the facts more accurately
and in more detail.

ti,

This cause went to trial upon the second amended
complaint of the appellant (R 15) in which were alleged
three causes of action, only the first two of which are
involved herein. The first cause of action alleges in
substance that appellant entered into a conditional
sales contract with the respondent at Salt Lake City
for the purchase of 'a 1946 Stake Body Ford truck
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for a stated price and that, as a part of the transaction, it was orally agreed by respondent's agent that
respondent would obtain insurance covering loss by
collision or upset under a type of policy commonly
known as a $100.00 deductible policy. The premium
for such insurance was added to the purchase price
for the truck and included in the total amount due
under the conditional sales contract after an allowance
had been made for a truck turned in by the appellant
at the time of' the purchase.
This transaction occurred on March 28, 1949 and
on April "6, 1949, near Boise, Idaho, the truck was
overturned, causing damage of approximately $665.00.
Appellant alleged that the defendant "wholly neglected"
to obtain collision insurance as agreed and that this
fact was concealed from him for a period of 60 days,
during which time he was without the use of his
truck, and in addition, he was required to pay all the
damage occasioned by the accident inasmuch as no
insurance policy had been obtained.
Appellant, in his first cause of' action, prayed judgment for the amount of the insurance premium, for
the cost of repair of the truck, and for loss of use of
the truck for the 60 day period during which it was
claimed the truck sat idle without being repaired because of the concealment by the respondent of the alleged
fact that no policy of insurance had been obtained.
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By its answer, the respondent denied that it
had failed to obtain an insurance policy, and upon
trial there was introduced as Defendant's Exhibit 4 a
policy of insurance covering the truck under a $100.00
deductible plan. Appellant never attempted to assail
the validity of the insurance policy. No evidence was
produced indicating that the policy was invalid or
void during the 75 day period following the original
insurance carrier had been denied by the carrier. This
was done through the testimony of the appellant and
the witness Imhoff. No agent or authorized employee
of the American Aviation & General Insurance Company was ever called to testify concerning the policy.
Imhoff was admittedly not an agent of the insurance
company; rather, he was an independent adjuster who
adjusts claims for the company in question and for
other companies (R 223). He was allowed to recite,
over timely objection, (R 224, 225) that he had been
informed that the company rejected the claim filed
transaction. To the contrary, apellant introduced by
his Exhibit D a Notice of Cancellation from the insurance carrier which indicates that the insurance carrier
cancelled the policy on June 20, 1949, 75 days after
its effective date of issue, from which it may be inferentially stated, upon the authorities hereinafter set forth,
that the policy was in force from the date shown upon
it until such time as it was cancelled. Appellant attempted to escape the force of the insurance policy
by introducing evidence that a claim presented to the
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by Redmond because the company "believed there was
no policy of insurance, any valid policy of insurance
at the time of this loss." Evidence was also introduced by the plaintiff of conversations between the
plaintiff, the respondent's agent, Mr. Petty, and Mr.
Vander, an insurance broker in Salt Lake City. This
evidence revealed that there had been a conflict between Petty and Vander as to the date of the application which was made by respondent for the insurance. Mr. Petty testified that he saw the application
in Vander's office and it bore a date stamp indicating
it was received by Vander on April 5th (R 216),
which was prior to the accident. This evidence is
uncontradicted. Neither V,ander, nor any representative of his office, was called to testify, nor was the
application produced, and it is fair to presume, from
this, that the missing evidence would have corroborated Mr. Petty's testimony.
At the conclusion of the evidence the respondent
moved the court for a directed verdict on the ground,
among others, that respondent, by its oral contract,
had agreed to obtain an insurance policy and that
such con tract had been fullfilled by reason of the
existence of the insurance policy, Exhibit 4. This
policy shows that the truck was covered from the
date of the conditional sales contract, to wit, March
28, 1949. The respondent urged upon its motion that it
was not required, under the terms of its oral contract,
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to guarantee that ·any claim brought under the terms
of the policy would be paid by the insurance company.
Since a policy was obtained and it was good upon its
face we argued to the court that the appellant's first
cause of action could not be successfully maintained
until and unless appellant had shown that this insurance policy was invalid either because of fraud, misrepresentation, or some other matter which would
give the insurance company a valid reason for dishonoring its policy. The court denied the motion,
remarking: ""ve have gone this far in this matter"
and ruling that the matter would be submitted to
the jury, but the court clearly indicated its belief that
the appellant could not maintain the action without
a showing that the insurance policy in evidence was
invalid, stating:
''I am going to submit it to the jury but
I will consider, take under advisement, the question of whether I may have to undo whatever
they do because I think you should first, as a
part of this action, adjudicate that you do not
have a good policy." (R 264, 265)

1 ::

!.

It was on this ground, among others, that the court,
after verdict, granted respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

As to the second cause of action, appellant, in
his complaint, alleged that respondent had made a
statement to the appellant that the truck would be
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warranted to be in good condition of repair for a
period of 90 days and that the warranty was breached
because a "wrist wrench" (Exhibit C) was in the
pan of the truck at the time of the purchase and the
wrench "caused the truck to be and become out of
repair and the motor to become defective" (R 17).
This cause of action was destroyed by appellant's
own testimony upon cross-examination, (R 123) when
he admitted that there was neither a written warranty
nor an oral warranty for any period of time whatever, -and that he had purchased the truck upon an
''as is'' basis as revealed by the purchase order,
Exhibit A. Over objection by respondent, evidence
was allowed of some sort of trade useage or custom
by which an implied warranty was claimed to have
controlled the transaction. Such implied warranty was
never pleaded -and was not within the issues framed
in the pleadings, and further was in contradiction to
the terms of the contract agreed upon by the parties
as evidenced by the purchase order, Exhibit A, and
the contract, Exhibit B. These latter factors, in addition to plaintiff's admissions (R 123), were the factors
recognized by the court when it granted the defendant's
motion for directed verdict as to this second cause
of action.
The appellant, by his brief, indicates that the only
considerations to be decided upon this appeal are the
questions of whether or not the court committed error
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in granting respondent's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the first cause of action,
and in directing a verdict for the respondent on the
appellant's second cause of action. Respondent's ,argument will be devoted to a consideration of the following points:
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED
UPON BY RESPONDENT
(A)

THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT UPON THE APPELLANT'S FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
(B) THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT ON
APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT UPON THE APPELLANT'S FIRST
CAUSE OF ACTION.

Respondent's Exhibit 4, the insurance policy in
question, was introduced in evidence and received by
the court without objection by the appellant. Examination reveals it to be the ordinary automobile insurance
policy covering the truck in question from March 28,
1949. The policy was prepared some time in the first
part of April, 1949 and was countersigned, as required
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by Utah law, on April 12, 1949. The evidence is with.
out dispute that it is a common practice in the insurance
business for policies to be back-dated to cover a
vehicle from the date of a conditional sales contract
for its purchase (R 236). It is also without dispute
in the evidence that this policy was ordered in the
ordinary course of business by the respondent com.
pany and that the policy was back-dated in accordance
with the ordinary course of business among automobile dealers, finance companies, and insurance companies, Exhibit A (R 235, 236).
It is significant that although the appellant was
confronted with the policy of insurance at an early
stage in the proceedings on this cause, no effort was
ever made to call for testimony any agent or employee
of the insurance company which wrote the policy or
of the agency which accepted the risk at the time
the respondent ordered the insurance. The appellant
produced no evidence of any kind to challenge the
validity of the insurance policy, but concentrated his
attack upon the proposition that the respondent should
be held liable because a claim had been presented on
an insurance policy and had been denied by the insur·
ance company because it believed there was no valid
policy in existence at the time of the loss, which belief
was based upon a dispute as to the time the appli·
cation for the insurance was filed. No other reason
for the den~al of the claim appears in the record.
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There is no evidence in the record of fraud or misrepresentation and this is for the very good reason
that there was no fraud or misrepresentation. The
appellant made no attempt to enforce the provisions
of the insurance policy although he knew of its existence.
He had no correspondence with the insurance company or with its local representatives. The policy stood
from the date of its issuance until June 20, 1949 without being challenged by the insurance company (R
118 -120). The insurance company took no action in
the weeks intervening between the proof of loss and
the notice of cancellation to invalidate the policy or
to exercise any option it might have had to void the
policy, which option is claimed by appellant to have
existed, in law.
By the terms of the or·al agreement between the
appellant and the respondent company, respondent company agreed to obtain insurance and when the insurance policy in evidence was obtained, its contract was
fullfilled. This agreement could not be extended by any
stretch of the imagination to include ·an agreement by
the respondent to guarantee that any loss or claim
under the policy would be honored by the insurance
company. Respondent could do no more than obtain
a policy and hold it in trust for the appellant, as is
the practice with a· conditional vendor, and exert such
effort and such pressure as it might have by reason
of prior dealings with the local insurance agent to
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see that the assured under the policy received fair treatment. This respondent attempted to do repeatedly.
Mr. Petty, having applied for the insur·ance, and believing the insurance to be in force, took appellant to
the insurance adjuster as soon as appellant returned
to Salt Lake City on or about April 11th or 12th,
1949 (R 240). He accompanied appellant to various
repair shops to arrange for repairs (R 238). H·e made
appointments to get repairs made and used his influence to make the appointments earlier than ordinarily
would have been the case. A clear indication of the
lack of good faith of appellant, to which further reference will be made, is found in the fact that appellant
failed to keep such an appointment at the Diamond T
Truck Company, although this was a long time before
any dispute had arisen about the insurance policy (R
189, 190).
The very nature of the claimed cause of ·action
set forth by the appellant as his first cause of action
can be no more than this : Respondent agreed to
obtain an insurance policy; appellant claims the
policy was never obtained and the contract was thus
violated; respondent produced the insurance policy
to show its contract was not violated. Clearly, then,
unless the appellant can show that the ·policy thus
obtained was ·a mere scrap of paper, the appellant
must fail. As pointed out by Appleman, in "Insurance
Law & Practice", Volume 3, Sec. 1811, et seq., an
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insurance policy, good and valid upon its face, is a
good, valid and subsisting contract between the insurance company and the assured until such time as
one of the following things occurs:

1. A court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates
that the policy is void.
2. The insurance company terminates the contract in accordance with the provisions of the policy
relating to termination or cancellation.
3. The insured terminates the contract by following the procedures set forth in the policy for terminating or cancelling the policy.
None of these alternative measures had occurred
prior to the institution of this law suit by appellant.
If either of the latter two alternatives had been commenced prior to the institution of the law suit, neither
could affect the rig.hts of any person under the policy
as it existed prior to such occurrence. The law in this
connection is well stated in 29 American Jurisprudence,
Insurance, Sec. 281, page 261, wherein it is stated:
''The cancellation of an insurance policy
does not affect the rights which have already
accrued under the policy in favor of the insured
or of a third person, and consequently, notice
of the insurer's previous election to terminate
the policy, given the insured after a loss has
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occurred, is manifestly insufficient to avoid liability under the policy for such loss."
This doctrine was referred to f,avorably by the
Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Schubach v.
American Surety Company of New York, 1929, 73
Utah 332, 273 Pac. 974, at page 354 of the Utah Reports.
It is extremely doubtful that a court would have
relieved the insurance company of its obligation under
this policy even if an action had been commenced
against the company on the policy, because the company, by its lack of action in the period from early
April until June 15, 1949, indicated its belief that
the policy was in existence and was in full force and
effect. This is further emphasized by the fact that
the notice of cancellation sent by the company to the
appellant, Exhibit D, follows the provisions of the
policy relating to cancellation by giving notice t.o
the insured that the policy would be cancelled five
days following the date of the notice, namely, on June
20, 1949. Such a notice of cancellation by the insurance company is said to be an ,admission that the
policy is in force as of the date of the notice of
cancellation. Appleman "Insurance Law and Practice",
Volume 12, Sec. 7124. Middleton vs. North American
Protective Association, 1931, 260 Ill. Appellate Courts 288.
Whether or not the insurance company would have
been relieved of its policy had an action been instituted
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against it cannot be determined in this law suit for
the reason that the question was not explored by the
appellant and no evidence ·was brought to bear by hin1
in his attack upon this policy. Appellant claims that
the jury passed on the questions herein involved adversely to the respondent and the instructions of the
court presented the matters to the jury and were based
upon competent evidence. A mere cursory reading of
this record reveals the fallacy of this statement. All
of the evidence in the record rela:ting to the insurance
policy may be summarized as follows: That the contract between the parties hereto was made March 28,
1949; that the insurance was applied for by employees
of the respondent company on March 30, 1949; that
in the next few days a request was received from the
insurance agency for two items of additional information about the appellant, namely, his age and previous
driving record; that the records of the insurance ag·ency
showed an application received by that office and date
stamped in the ordinary course of business on April 5,
1949; that an accident occurred to the truck April 6,
1949, which fact was made known to the respondent on
April 7 or 8, 1949; that appellant returned to Salt
Lake City on April 11 or 12, 1949, with the truck;
that the necessary proofs of loss and other notices to
the insurance company were presented personally to the
adjuster, Imhoff, on or about April 14, 1949; that
two weeks later a conversation was had between Mr.
Petty, representing the respondent, and Mr. Redmond,
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for himself, and a Mr. Vander, the insurance agent, at
which time a dispute arose between Petty and Vander
as to the date of the application received by Vander's
office; that the claim was later denied by the company
because of its belief that no valid policy existed at
the time of the loss.
It is submitted that none of the foregoing evidence
even bears remotely on the question of whether or
not the respondent obtained a valid insurance policy.
The policy was in evidence. It was good and valid
upon its face. No evidence was brought into court
showing it was not valid and not good upon its face,
and no evidence was produced from any competent
person who could speak for the insurance company that
the insurance company did not consider the policy in
full force and effect until after the institution of this
action. Obviously such evidence would have been easy
for the appellant to obtain had it been in existence,
because such evidence would have aided the insurance
company in getting "off the risk". It was the appel~
lant who had the burden of successfully assailing the
insurance policy. Equally obvious is the fact that
the respondent could not have obtained such evidence
~ven if it had been available because the insurance com~
pany, at the time of trial, had taken the position that
its policy was of no force and effect from the date of
June 20, 1949 and forward, and it would be extremely
difficult for the respondent to find willing testimony
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
contradicting a decision which had been made by the
responsible company.
It was because of this lack of competent evidence
impugning the validity of the policy that the trial
court correctly ruled that the appellant had the burden
of showing that the insurance policy was invalid before
it could successfully maintain its first cause of action.
Of course, respondent, after its motion for directed
verdict was denied before submission to the jury, was
required to submit such requests for instructions as
would tend to mitigate the damages which might be
returned by the jury in a situation such as this, but
it did so without abandoning its position that the entire
matter was not a question for the jury.

In addition to all of the foregoing, however, there
is another factor which, it seems to us, is conclusive
of this phase of this appeal. The question of whether
or not this contract was breached by the respondent is
a question primarily of law. The question of the
validity of the insurance policy is primarily a question
of law. Particularly is this true when, as here, there
is a complete lack of competent evidence relating to
the insurance policy and only a hodgepodge of inconclusive evidence about matters leading up to the existence of the policy. It is the familiar rule on appeal
in cases of this kind that the trial court's action will
not be disturbed unless there is a substantial showing
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by the appellant of error or abuse of discretion. It
is submitted that the appellant in his brief, has done
little more than quote testimony favorable to himself
and favorable to his construction of the problem pres-ented, and tha.t a fair examination of the entire record reveals that the trial court had no alternative but
to remove the legal question of the validity of a document from jury consideration. It is difficult to see
how the trial court could have done otherwis-e, particularly in view of the fact that the insurance company,
whose policy was attempted to be destroyed by its own
insured, was never present in court, either as a party
or by competent agents or employees as witnesses.
Our research has not revealed a case in this jurisdiction or ·elsewhere which could be said to be in point
on the problem presented on this appeal. Most of the
cases which have arisen in this branch of insurance law
have been actions between an insured and a broker
or other insurance agent for failure to obtain or procure insurance for the benefit of the insured. Such
recoveries as have been allowed have usually been
upon the proposition that the broker failed to exercise
that degree of professional skill or judgment required
of him when he assumed to act for the insured. The
facts which were produced in thes-e cases to show a
breach of the contract have usually revealed that the
broker pl,aced the insurance in an insolvent insurance
company or in a foreign insurance company not auSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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thorized to do business in the state where the transaction occurred, so that when the insured attempted
to enforce the provisions of his policy he found no
process agent or other person on whom service of
process could be had, and thus his policy was little
more than a scrap of paper. We have found no case
where a person has agreed to obtain insurance for an
insured and has obtained the insurance and has later
been held responsible to the insured becaus-e of the
refusal of the insurance company to honor a claim
under its policy. To require the broker to stand in the
shoes of the insurance company so far as the insured
is concerned is to make the broker an insurer, which
should not be done unless the broker, by his own conduct, or by the lack of due care or failure to take
reasonable steps to obtain insurance, has visited such
liability upon his own shoulders. We believe the rule
applicable to brokers is equally applicable to the situa~
tion which presents itself here. The only ,exception to
that statement may arise in the event a statutory pro~
vision creates special duties and requirements for persons acting as brokers, with which contingency we are
not concerned in this case.
The general rule is summarized in 29 American
Juris prudence, Insurance, Sec. 107, page 129, as follows: The broker or agent "must exercise such reasonable skill and ordinary diligence as may fairly be expected from a person in his situation in doing what is
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necessary to effect an insurance policy, in seeing that
it effectually covers the property to be insured in selecting the insurer and ascertaining that it is of good credit
and standing and in obtaining as good terms as are
reasonably possible.'' Section 108 of the S'ame volume
states the general rule to be that "one who undertakes
to procure insurance on the property of another and,
unjustifiably and through his fault or neglect, fails to
do so will be held liable for any damage resulting therefrom.'' In this connection it is interesting, in view of
the amounts claimed by appel1ant, to note the measure of
damages applied under the general rule just quoted. The
measure of damages, according to American Jurisprudence, is "the amount that would have been due under
the insurance policy provided it had been obtained."
From the foregoing rules it is apparent that no
showing was made by the appellant which entitles him
to recover from this respondent for the alleged failure
to obtain the insurance policy in question. There was
never a showing of neglect or fault on the part of the
respondent. Indeed, it is difficult to see what the respondent could have done that it did not do. Appellant
confines himself to a showing simply of a dispute which
arose between an adjuster, (not employed by the insurance company involved) and the appellant and respondent, which culminated in information being received by the appellant from the insurance adjuster to
the effect that the claim under the insurance policy had
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been denied. The appellant could furnish no additional
evidence that the insurance company was ever requested
to honor its policy or ever requested to explain in
detail its apparent refusal to pay the claim as presented to it through the adjuster, Imhoff.
We submit that the insurance company, on the
basis of this record, could not successfully defend an
action against it on this policy, particularly when the
records of its own general agent show the application
was commenced on March 30 and completed on April
5, both dates being before the loss occurred. This policy
was a good and valid policy and, by obtaining it, respondent fully and completely performed its contract
with appellant.
THE COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DIRECTING A
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT ON APPELLANT'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.

The second cause of action set forth in appellant's
second amended complaint (R 15) alleged an agreement
by which the respondent warranted the condition of the
instant truck for a 90 day period. This alleged warranty
was denied by the respondent's answer. When the appellant on cross-examination (R 123) admitted that he
had never been given a written warranty or an oral
warranty of any kind, and admitted further that he had
purchased the truck on an ''as is'' basis, this cause of
action was effectively destroyed. However, appellant
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thereafter produced a string of witnesses ~attempting
to show some sort of implied warranty by trade usage.
This evidence was received by the court over respondent's repeated and timely objections. The objections
went to the proposition, first, that such issues were not
framed by the pleadings and had never been claimed by
the appellant until that moment of the trial, and, secondly, that the written contracts and purchase order
documents which had been received in evidence effectively eliminated the possibility of a warranty, and
appellant, by his own testimony, had admitted that the
purchase had been made by the use of these documents
and that no agreement outside the documents had been
made. Even after the admission of such evidence of a
trade useage, it was quite clear that there was no substantial evidence upon which this cause of action could
have been submitted to the jury. Respondent cited to
the court below, upon the occasion of the argument and
presentment of its motion for directed verdict on the
second cause of action, the case of Landes & Co., vs.
Fallows, et al, 81 Utah 432, 19 Pac. 2nd 389 (1933),
which case involved a similar contract to the contract
at bar, and which case was decided adversely to the position now asserted by the appellant.
The appellant's testimony concerning the alleged
warranty was in direct conflict to the claim set forth
in his complaint, and in addition to this fact, the appellant admitted that the truck had been examined by
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him and the engine had sounded all right to him at the
time of the purchase. He admitted he had been told
that the truck was not new and he knew he was buying
a used vehicle. Although the truck was fully loaded,
no difficulty was encountered in its operation for many
hundreds of miles.
It is also significant that, when this lawsuit was
instituted, appellant's only claim of breach of warranty.
was grounded upon the claim that the wrist wrench in
.the pan of the truck caused the defective condition of
the engine. No other claim was ever made by appellant
until the day of trial, when he apparently abandoned
the wrist wrench, after his ''expert'' witnesses, Lake
(R 162) and Moulton (R 174) both admitted the wrist
wrench could not have caused the trouble. Then, appellant began to rely on a claim that the engine was
worn out at the time of purchase, and even this evidence
was sharply contradicted. This latter claim could only
be "afterthought" and was entitled to little or no consideration by the trial court, in view of all the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
This case presents the rather unusual situation of
a purchaser of a truck turning in an old truck as down
payment on a newer truck and entering upon a written
contract -providing for regular m·onthly payments and,
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chaser under this arrangement, and even though the
seller did everything within its power to assist the
purchaser when misfortune occurred and the truck was
wrecked, the purchaser nevertheless brings action
against the seller for breach of the contract to obtain
insurance. Further than that, the purchaser appears'
not to be content to seek merely what he would have
had had the insurance company honored his claim under
his policy, but instead seeks to recover the sum of
$417.00 insurance premium, which sum he has never
paid and seeks to recover for loss of use ·of the
truck for a 60 day ·period when, by his own testimony,
it would not have taken more than two weeks to repair the truck, (R 121) particularly had he kept the
appointments and complied with the arrangements that
had been made by Mr. Petty of the respondent company
to see to it that the repairs were accomplished within
the fastest possible time. If the appellant, who is the
purchaser here, was desirous simply of being restored
to the position in which he would have been had no difficulty arisen in connection with this policy, it seems
reasonable to suppose that he would have combined
his efforts with those of the respondent company for the
purpose of re·pairing his truck and getting it back on
the road and in service in the fastest possible time. We
submit, however, that this has not been his intention at
any time. The record is without contradiction that he
has willfully withheld permission for respondent to
e~amine the truck or to inspect it (R 239), all as proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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vided by the terms of the contract. He failed to keep
the appointments made for him by the respondent and
did absolutely nothing toward remedying the difficulties with which he was faced, and finally brought
suit against the respondent prior to the time when
the insurance policy was cancelled and at a time when
respondent was still attempting to help the appellant.

m:
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These factors, which bear upon the good faith of
the appellant, colored his entire case and, when con.
sidered with the fact that the insurance policy, Exhibit 4, stands unchallenged and when coupled further
with the fact that the appellant's exorbitant claim of
a breach of warranty crumbled by his own testimony
on cross-examination, there can be no doubt that the
action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the
respondent on the second cause of action and reversing the judgment and verdict of the jury on the first
cause of action, was emminently proper and amply
supported by the record, and should be sustained by
this court.
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Respectfully submitted,

EDGAR C. JENSEN,
JOHN H. SNOW,
Attorneys for Respondent
and Defendant.
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